<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Market-Microstructure on Ryan Orban</title><link>https://ryanorban.com/categories/market-microstructure/</link><description>Recent content in Market-Microstructure on Ryan Orban</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><managingEditor>me@ryanorban.com (Ryan Orban)</managingEditor><webMaster>me@ryanorban.com (Ryan Orban)</webMaster><copyright>Ryan Orban</copyright><lastBuildDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://ryanorban.com/categories/market-microstructure/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Market Making (Lecture Notes 04a)</title><link>https://ryanorban.com/notes/market-making-lecture-notes/</link><pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>me@ryanorban.com (Ryan Orban)</author><guid>https://ryanorban.com/notes/market-making-lecture-notes/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="summary" class="scroll-mt-8 group"&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;These lecture notes cover market making — the practice of continuously posting both bid and ask prices in a financial instrument to earn the bid-ask spread while managing the associated risks. A market maker is the counterparty of last resort: they commit to buying when sellers arrive and selling when buyers arrive, providing liquidity that makes markets function. In return they earn the spread, but they accept two interacting risks: inventory risk (accumulating unwanted positions) and adverse selection risk (trading against informed counterparties who know the true value).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Maximal Extractable Value and Constant Function Market Makers</title><link>https://ryanorban.com/notes/mev-cfmm/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>me@ryanorban.com (Ryan Orban)</author><guid>https://ryanorban.com/notes/mev-cfmm/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="summary" class="scroll-mt-8 group"&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;This paper examines maximal extractable value (MEV) — the additional value that block producers on Ethereum and similar proof-of-work or proof-of-stake chains can extract by controlling transaction ordering within a block — specifically in the context of constant function market makers (CFMMs) like Uniswap, Curve Finance, and Balancer. CFMMs define a pricing function over a liquidity pool that automatically executes trades when a user&amp;rsquo;s specified price satisfies the constraint; the paper formalizes how this deterministic pricing mechanism creates systematic opportunities for front-running, sandwich attacks, and arbitrage by actors who can observe the mempool and manipulate transaction sequencing.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>